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ABSTRACT: This paper studies the unique nature, institutional roots, and economic 
consequences of the ruler’s political power in Islamic History.  An influential interest group in 
Islamic societies has been the legal community, whose power could range from being able to 
regulate the rulers to being entirely under their control.  The struggle was over the provision of 
legal goods and services, the legal community gradually gaining control of the law in history and 
the rulers seeking to appropriate political power by controlling the legal community.  The 
economic consequence of power was the ability to dictate the choice of tax bases and rates. 
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Law, State Power, and Taxation in Islamic History 
 
One of the widely held beliefs about the history of Islamic societies has been the 
enormity of the power of the rulers.  Strong rulers are perceived to have been a typical fixture of 
the political landscape of the Islamic Civilization from its beginning in the seventh century to 
recent times, a vast majority of Islamic societies being governed by rulers with few institutional 
constraints on their coercive powers.  Most scholars, from  Machiavelli in the sixteenth century 
to modern analysts of present-day Middle Eastern monarchies, have variously described 
governance in these societies as being “despotic,” “dictatorial,” and “authoritarian,” giving them 
as examples of “extreme centralization,” “patrimonial domination,” or rule “by a prince and his 
servants.”
1
Although the strength of rulers in Islamic history appears to be an established fact, far 
less is known with certainty about the nature of this power, where it has come from, and how it 
has affected economic outcomes and performance.  Previous studies have examined the several 
dimensions of the Muslim ruler’s power over the general public, such as the religious, military, 
and political nature of his power.  They have also identified a variety of factors, ranging from 
internal conflicts to external threats, which have caused his power to rise and fall over time.  
They have not systematically studied, however, the deeper institutional roots of this power and 
the mechanisms through which it has been maintained.  Recent developments in the political 
economy literature on long term development have not been fully employed to the study of 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Cahen (1970), Findley (1980), Finer (1997), Machiavelli (1950: Chapter 4), and numerous other 
references cited in Powelson (1997: Appendix 19.1). 
  1Islamic history.  Similarly, studies of balance of power in Islamic societies have typically failed 
to examine the economic consequences of this power systematically.    
The power relationship between the ruler and the general public is clearly a complex and 
multi-dimensional phenomenon, and our purpose is to study a crucial piece of this complicated 
puzzle, namely the role of the legal community in relation to the ruler’s political power and his 
ability to tax.  More specifically, we have three objectives.  The first objective is to discuss the 
unique nature of the legal community’s role in Islamic societies as a potential constraint on the 
political power of the ruler.   Depending on its control over the provision of legal goods and 
services, the legal community could generate various degrees of power and influence various 
institutions and outcomes.  Our second objective is to identify the institutional roots of the rulers’ 
power in Islamic history.  Studying long term trends in the legal community’s relationship with 
the rulers and the general public in Islamic history, we trace how the legal community was able 
to establish direct control over the provision of legal goods and services and how the rulers were 
able to acquire political power indirectly by gaining control over the legal community.  The third 
objective is to study the economic consequences of power for taxation.  Having power also 
meant being able to exert influence on economic behavior and outcomes.  We show how the rise 
and fall of the rulers’ political power had direct implications in their ability to choose tax bases 
and rates.  
 
 
STUDIES OF STATE POWER IN ISLAMIC HISTORY 
 The struggle for power has been a persistent and complicated problem in the Islamic Middle 
East, as it was in other parts of the World.  As the birthplace of many of the World’s greatest 
  2civilizations, the region has witnessed the emergence and disappearance of numerous states and 
the rising and falling powers of numerous rulers.  Since the rise of Islam in the seventh century, 
various rulers have come to power, including the Umayyads, Abbasids, Mamluks, Safavids, and 
the Ottomans.  The struggle for power has involved a complex web of relationships between the 
rulers and the general public, drawing in various other parties and mixed up with various tribal, 
ethnic, religious and other conflicts.   
By the time the Ottomans came to power at the beginning of the fourteenth century, various 
legal, political, financial, and other types of institutions had been established by previous Islamic 
states, on which the Ottomans could build the foundations of their authority.  The strong 
government they were able to develop became one of the well-known characteristics of the 
Empire, often cited to distinguish it from contemporary European states during its long rule for 
six centuries until the First World War.  Although there were occasional periods of revolts and 
internal conflicts, the Ottomans did not lose the throne or face perilous internal threats during 
this period
2.  
The seemingly insurmountable power of the Ottoman sultans has earned them a longstanding 
reputation as authoritarian rulers, variously observed by contemporaries and generally 
acknowledged by modern historians.  Comparing the Ottoman system of government with that of 
France, Machiavelli (1950: Chapter 4) gave the Ottoman Empire as an example of government 
“by a prince and his servants,” unlike the French government, which was ruled “by a prince and 
by barons” with a more popular support.  Echoes of this description can be found in today’s 
                                                 
2 For the power of the Ottoman government in taxation, see Coşgel (2005) and Coşgel and Miceli (2006). As a 
testimony of the strength of Ottoman government, economic historians have typically taken this strength as given, 
attributing to it such a key role that the rise and fall of the Empire as a whole was once measured by the changes in 
the strength of this sector alone.  Even the more recent revisionist history has given the public sector a central role in 
explanations.  The longevity of the Ottoman Empire, for example, has recently been attributed primarily to the 
pragmatism of its rulers and the flexibility of its public sector (Pamuk, 2004). 
  3literature on political history.  Finer (1997: 1173), for example, has described the Ottoman sultan 
as having “wielded in the most capricious way a literally despotic power over the life, liberty, 
and property of all his officials since they all were his kul – his slaves.”  Generalizing this 
description to Ottoman authority as a whole, Findley (1980: 7) has argued that “the powers of the 
[Ottoman] sultan were immense; the governance of the empire was largely dependent on his 
personal discretion.” 
Remarks on the strength of Ottoman rulers are consistent with those made on the 
deteriorating relative strength of the private economy in Islamic history.  Kuran (2004) has 
argued that various institutional rigidities in the Islamic economic system were responsible for 
generating evolutionary bottlenecks and for causing the strength of the private sector to 
deteriorate over time.  The Islamic law of inheritance, strict individualism of Islamic law and its 
lack of a concept of corporation, and rigid regulations of pious foundations imposed various 
constraints in the system, ultimately preventing the structural transformations required for the 
continuing strength of the private sector and steady long run economic growth.  Although these 
institutions were key components of an economic system that had once achieved remarkable 
levels of prosperity, they had become severe constraints on economic behavior by the nineteenth 
century.
3  At that point, the discretionary power enjoyed by Ottoman rulers stood in sharp 
contrasts with the rigidities faced by private actors. 
   The power held by Ottoman sultans is often generalized to be a permanent characteristic of 
all Islamic societies in history.  In his discussion of Muslim jurists’ views on political authority, 
Gibb (1955: 17) has noted that “[t]he actual historical system…with which the jurists were 
confronted was a system in which all political authority was centered in the caliph-imām, and no 
authority was valid unless exercised by delegation from him, directly or indirectly.”  Similarly 
                                                 
3 See also Orbay (2006) for the role of imperial pious foundations in this process. 
  4commenting on caliphal power during the Abbasid period, Finer (1997: 693) has argued that 
“[i]nside his jurisdiction this caliphal power was so absolute and the position of the subject so 
precarious that it amounts to despotism, the utterly unbridled exercise of personal power.”  
Underlying these views is the conception that no significant limits have emerged to constrain the 
rulers throughout Islamic history.  Comparing limits on rulers in Middle Eastern empires with 
those in Japan and northwestern Europe, Powelson (1994: 282) has thus noted that in the former 
“[a]t no point have these limits become institutionalized, so that power might become more 
diffuse from generation to generation.” 
A common explanation of the source of power is to attribute it to religious factors, in 
addition to pure military strength, originating from the notion of the caliphate, the supreme 
headship of the Islamic state, serving the dual functions of political and religious leadership.  
Because of their ability to concentrate religious and political functions in one office, Muslim 
rulers have been viewed as being able to draw massive power from these two spheres, rather than 
having to rely on alliance, negotiation, or popular support in constructing a power base.  In a 
well-known study of the nature of authority in early Islamic history, Crone and Hinds (1986) 
have argued that such concentration of power in one office took place as early as the time of the 
early caliphs.  Generalizing this to all of Middle Eastern history, Powelson (1997: 278) has 
argued that “[p]ower derives from military and religious sources instead of a broad base 
comprising individual capabilities and institutional positions other than military or religious.”   
Although the theocratic nature of the Muslim ruler’s power is important, this alone does 
not explain the mechanism through which the power was acquired and maintained.  There could 
be a number of different arrangements between the political and religious organizations in 
governance.  For example, they could be independent from each other, one could control the 
  5other, and there could be a vertical alliance between them (Coşgel, Langlois, Miceli, and 
Zimmermann, 2007). Moreover, they could also draw additional power from other influential 
groups that had popular support.  Each of these arrangements would imply a different 
distribution of power and a different set of mechanisms available for the rulers to appropriate it 
for their own use.  In Islamic history, not all societies have been ruled by caliphs, and not all 
caliphs have had effective control in both political and religious domains.  Ottoman rulers, for 
example, were powerful at a time when the religious and political ruling institutions had long 
been separated.  Rather than presume power to be simply originating automatically from 
religious offices or nominal titles, we need to explore its institutional roots in the society.   
  Studying the evolution of state power in Islamic history has important implications for 
understanding long term growth, particularly during the time of the Ottomans, a time when rulers 
were increasingly facing institutional constraints to their coercive powers in the West.  In a 
pioneering study of the importance of institutions constraining rulers, North and Weingast (1989) 
have identified political institutions as being primarily responsible for British economic growth.  
More recent research has shown the variety of other, deeper institutional factors constraining the 
coercive powers of rulers and contributing to the rise of northwestern Europe
4.  Studying state 
power in Islamic history is important because it may be the absence of these constraints that 
prevented similar growth from taking place in the Islamic world during the same period. 
 
 
                                                 
4 For examples of observed constraints, see Acemoğlu (2005), Acemoğlu and Robinson (2005), Djankov, et al. 
(2003), Greif (2005), McGuire and Olson (1996), Weingast (2005). 
  6STATE POWER AND THE LEGAL COMMUNITY 
Power can be defined and measured in many different ways.  Acemoğlu and Robinson (2005: 
21) distinguish between two types of political power.  The first is de facto power, referring to 
“what a group can do to other groups and the society at large by using force.”  This is not the 
only source of power, however, because groups can also acquire power through political 
institutions such as the system of government and the types of institutional constraints imposed 
on the rulers in each system.  This second type of power is called de jure (institutional) political 
power. 
  Political power can affect economic institutions and outcomes in various ways 
(Acemoğlu and Robinson (2005, 2006).  Since the interests of the rulers, general public, and 
influential groups generally conflict, it is unlikely that they will prefer the same set of economic 
institutions.  Given this conflict, although some abstract economic principle such as efficiency or 
fairness may also influence the outcome, the final choice would most likely be arbitrated by the 
political powers of the parties involved.  The distribution of political power has influenced 
numerous economic institutions in history, including monetary policy, welfare programs, and the 
definition of property rights.  Taxation is typically at the center of these conflicts, because in 
choosing tax bases and rates the ruler may use his political power to serve his own interests at the 
expense of the rest of the society (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980). The relative powers of the 
ruler, general public, and other interest groups would ultimately arbitrate the conflict over taxes. 
  What can make democracies and constitutional monarchies more conducive to economic 
growth than absolute monarchies is the existence of groups with de jure power given by political 
institutions, which can constrain the ruler’s power and facilitate the establishment of appropriate 
economic institutions.  One of the well-known examples of how political institutions and power 
  7have influenced economic institutions and performance is the role of the British parliament 
during the Glorious Revolution (North and Weingast, 1989).  It is also well-known that identical 
political institutions like the parliament did not exist in Islamic societies during the same period 
as the rise of the West to play the same role.  There were, however, other organized groups that 
wielded de facto or at times even institutional power, which could have served a similar function 
in constraining the rulers.   
  One of these key groups was the legal community.  In Islamic societies the legal 
community consisted of individuals trained in the Islamic Law, serving primarily as teachers 
(mudarris) educating the Muslim community, as judges (qādī) resolving legal disputes, or as 
jurisconsults (muftī) offering legal opinions (Hallaq, 2005).  Although members of this 
community performed numerous religious, social, and administrative functions, ranging from 
teaching the Qur'an to collecting taxes, two functions were essential in their relationship to the 
rulers: the provision of public services that could increase production (e.g., clarification of 
property rights) and the issuance of regulations that could affect the rulers (e.g., confirming the 
legality of a proposed course of action)
5.   
  The legal community has thus been in a unique position to regulate the relationship 
between the ruler and the public because of its dual responsibilities to provide services to the 
public and to impose constraints on the rulers through the interpretation and adjudication of the 
law.  Members of this community possessed skills and knowledge which the rulers could obtain 
only with great difficulty.
6  Moreover, the demand for their services was typically high and very 
inelastic.  By controlling the provision of legal goods and services, the legal community could 
                                                 
5 For a discussion of the major issues and a review of the relevant literature on constitutional jurisprudence in Islam, 
see Jackson (1996: xiii-xlii). 
6 For the strength of legal community in Islamic history, see Humphreys (1991: Chapter 8), Ghazzal (2005), and 
Zaman (2002). 
  8acquire tremendous power and exercise it in influencing various religious, political, and 
economic institutions and outcomes. 
The legal community could function at different degrees of independence from the ruler.  
A society could use private litigation to resolve disputes, rely on judges serving as public 
officials, or restrict justice to dictatorial command (Djankov, et al, 2003).  The social origins and 
economic consequences of these possibilities have been the focus of a recent and rapidly 
growing literature in economics.  For example, studying the origins of differences between 
English and French legal systems, Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) have argued that the divergence in 
the degrees of centralization and dictatorship between the two systems originated from the 
differences between these countries in their enforcement environment going back to the twelfth 
and thirteenth centuries.  Tridimas (2005) and LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer 
(2004) have similarly studied judicial differences among a large number of countries to explain 
variations in economic freedom and the relative size of government.  The legal system has been 
the focus of economic explanations of numerous other historical phenomena and episodes of 
institutional design
7. 
  Islamic Law has been conspicuously absent from the economic literature on the 
relationship between law and state power.  In their influential classification of the legal systems 
of the World into four major families of law, LaPorta, et al. (1998) have declined to recognize 
the Islamic (and other religious) Law as a separate category, arguing instead that “religious 
traditions …appear to be less relevant in matters of investor protection.” (p. 1118n)  Focusing on 
secular traditions and considering the Islamic past less important than the influence of western 
colonial and mandatory powers, they have placed countries that have had Islamic influence on 
                                                 
7 For reviews of some of this literature, see Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2001), Djankov, et al (2003) and 
Fergusson (2006). 
  9their legal systems into one of the four western-centric families (English, French, German, and 
Scandinavian) that comprise the World’s systems.   Although this may be justified to a degree in 
static classifications of the legal systems of today, no economic studies have emerged to expand 
on these categories by examining the evolution of the legal system in Islamic history.  Despite 
Kuran’s (2004) pioneering analysis of the relationship between the rigidities of the Islamic legal 
system and the economic underdevelopment of the private sector, the economics of the 
relationship between the legal system and state power in the Islamic world has not been 
systematically studied. 
8
  The Islamic Law did not specifically prescribe or rule out any of the possible 
relationships between the rulers and the legal community.  The duties of obeying rulers and 
reaching consensus were both supported by the law, allowing various scenarios to be realized as 
necessary.  The importance of both obedience and consensus is evident in recognized sources of 
law in Islam.  In a passage frequently quoted to identify principal sources of Islamic Law, the 
Qur’an states: “O you believers! Obey God and obey the Messenger and those of you who are in 
charge of affairs.” (Qur’an 4:59).  The sources of Law indicated here are the Qur’an, the tradition 
of Prophet Muhammad (Sunnah), and consensus (ijmā)
9.  The implication for state power and 
actions was for the ruler to make decisions by following the Qur’an and the Prophet’s tradition, 
and seeking consensus from the legal community as necessary
10.  There was thus the necessary 
basis for establishing an institutional structure with a powerful legal community.  Even if such a 
structure was not established, there was sufficient room for the legal community to use its 
                                                 
8 For an exception, see Johansen (1988).  For their part, scholars and historians of the Islamic Law have not entered 
the discussion in the economics literature either.  For recent studies of the law and state power in Islamic history, see 
Hallaq (2005), Vikør (2005) and Zubaida (2003). 
9 For other sources of law and principles of Islamic jurisprudence, see Kamali (1991). 
10 For examples of legal limitations on the ruler, see Abū Yūsuf (1979), Al Mawardi (1996), Jackson (1996), Kamali 
(2005), and Lapidus (1984). 
  10capabilities and accomplishments to build de facto power.  Depending on the distribution of 
power between the ruler, legal community, and the general public, various configurations of 
obedience and consensus were possible between them, resulting in numerous possibilities for the 
legal community to influence political power and economic institutions and outcomes in Islamic 
societies.  
 
LEGAL COMMUNITY AND STATE POWER IN ISLAMIC HISTORY 
Of the numerous possible forms of power relationship between the rulers, legal 
community, and the general public, three specific cases stood out in Islamic history as being the 
most typical, dominating at different times and places.  One of these (chronologically the first) 
was the case of an insufficiently developed and weak legal community.  In this case, the ruler 
had free rein to be directly involved in the provision of legal goods and services and had the 
ability to raise his own power against the general public.  Another possibility (next in 
chronological order) was the case of a highly developed and strong legal community, acting 
somewhat independently from the ruler.  The legal community was able to assert its power to 
protect the law and regulate economic outcomes, against the wishes of the ruler if necessary.  
The last (more recent) possibility was the case of a strong (relative to general public) legal 
community but one that was under the institutional control of the ruler.  By somehow gaining 
direct control over the legal community, the rulers were able to appropriate whatever power this 
community could gather from the provision of legal goods and services.  Although there were 
other cases of power equilibrium observed in Islamic history, these three cases dominated. 
  The distribution of political power before the development of Islamic Law was very 
different from that in the period following its formation.  While the Islamic Law was still 
  11developing in early history, the rulers enjoyed considerable freedom in decision making as their 
rights and obligations were not fully defined.  Before the legal community was established, the 
ruler’s monopoly in violence and political leadership extended to the interpretation and 
application of the law.  This was evident during most of the rule of the Umayyad and the early 
Abbasids, a period generally considered as being highly autocratic
11.    
  The rulers used a variety of measures during this period to secure their monopoly power 
over leadership.  They restricted others’ entry into the power struggle by defining the right to 
rule in divine and hereditary (based on kinship or tribal relationship to Prophet Muhammad) 
terms.  They similarly boosted their power by claiming titles, such as “the Deputy of God,” 
chosen to legitimize their rule in absolute religious terms.  They also defined tradition as one of 
the sources of law not strictly in terms of the prophetic tradition (Sunnah) but in terms of all 
kinds of acknowledged customs and precedents (sunan) including their own, thus eliminating the 
need for independent scholars specialized in interpretation and consequently gaining the freedom 
to interpret the law on their own (Crone and Hinds, 1986).  Complete centralization of authority 
can be observed during the rule of Abdul Malik who built a model for the coming Muslim rulers.  
Consolidation of power was manifest in the standardized Arab coinage, Arabization of the 
administration and the dependence on the power of the army (Kennedy, 1986; Hawting, 2000). 
The rulers had the ultimate political and legal authority, and the legal community was not 
sufficiently developed to have the power to regulate their behavior significantly.   
  The legal community increasingly gained power and independence during the first 
century of the Abbasid rule.  With the expansion of the Islamic state came the beginning of 
specialization in legal knowledge and the development of legal institutions.  A division of labor 
took place between the ruler and the legal community, the rulers’ monopoly becoming restricted 
                                                 
11 For a history of the law, politics, and society during the formative period, see Berkey (2003). 
  12to military and political leadership, while the legal community overtook the provision of legal 
and religious services.  The gathering, interpretation, and application of the law increasingly 
shifted out of the ruler’s domain and fell into the monopoly of the legal community.  A key 
component of the transformation was the increasing importance of the tradition of Prophet 
Muhammad, guarded and monopolized by the legal community (Ghazzal, 2005; Hallaq, 2005).   
The legal knowledge and procedures became more institutionalized, judicial organization 
became more hierarchical, and a further division of labor took place within the legal community, 
particularly between the functions of adjudication and interpretation.  Even though the rulers 
could attempt to influence adjudication by controlling the hierarchy of the judges, the 
jurisconsults principally maintained independence in the generation and interpretation of legal 
knowledge, providing the legal community a degree of autonomy
12.  The result was a more 
powerful and independent legal community, as authority shifted from the rulers to the legal 
community (Zubaida, 2003: 76).  The division of labor occasionally caused a rift between the 
rulers and the legal community, with the rulers now potentially becoming subject to adjudication, 
regulation, and consultation by the legal community, depending on their relative powers.   
 The  “inquisition”  (al mihna, 833-47) institutionalized by the Caliph Al Ma’mun marks a 
turning point in the balance of powers between the ruler and the legal community.  In a well-
known confrontation between them, the Caliph attempted to assert the belief of the createdness 
of the Qur’an among leading religious scholars.  The belief that the Qur’an is created would have 
implied that it is not without error and thus the Caliph could at any time use his discretion to 
change any of the commands or the laws given in the Qur’an.  The evidence indicates that the 
                                                 
12 Although the judges were initially needed to fulfill administrative tasks and later to justify the power of the 
caliphs to the people, their power grew to challenge caliphal law.  It is not a coincidence that Umayyad Caliph, 
Yazīd b. ‘Abd Al-Malik (101/718-105/723) was cited as the last caliph whose practices and laws constituted 
authority statement. (Hallaq, 2005:68). 
  13motivation behind the inquisition was not for the doctrine to prevail over all beliefs per se, but 
rather to secure for the Caliphate an unquestioned authority on all matters in response to the 
growing authority of the legal community (Nawas, 1996; Hurvitz, 2001; Berkey, 2003).  The 
ruler’s effort to dominate religious matters eventually failed.  Al Mamun is cited as the last 
Caliph who tried to dominate religious and secular affairs (Van Ess, 2006).  The new Caliph Al 
Mutawakkil was forced to abandon the attempt in 847 and accept the autonomy of the legal 
community.  The failure of the inquisition definitively marked the establishment of the 
independence of the legal community and the monopoly power they had earned in the provision 
of legal goods and services.  
Although the power of the legal community increased during this period, the triumph was 
short lived under the Abbasids.  At some point the decline in the power of the ruler coincided 
with the rise in external threats, eventually bringing the Abbasid rule to an end.  The significant 
changes that followed in the political landscape of the Islamic World, however, did not mean an 
end to the power of the legal community, which had by now acquired a momentum of its own.  
The Islamic legal system had been institutionalized, judicial procedures were well-established, 
and the monopoly of the legal community in adjudication and interpretation was recognized. 
The next set of significant changes that altered the power relationship between the rulers 
and the legal community was to come under the Ottomans, who ruled under a very different set 
of circumstances than the Abbasids.  Comparing the two polities, Finer (1997: 1163-4) has 
identified various striking differences.  A significant difference was the greater demographic 
heterogeneity observed in the Ottoman Empire, as seen in the variety of languages, religions, and 
ethnicities found within its domain.  A significant proportion of the Ottoman population was 
non-Muslims, living in communities whose autonomy was preserved under the millet system.  
  14Although a similar heterogeneity existed in the early Abbasid Empire, the population soon 
became more homogenous through conversion and assimilation.  The implication for political 
power was that it was harder for the more heterogeneous Ottoman population to establish a 
power base and unite against the rulers in revolt.  In a similar comparison of the Ottoman Empire 
with France, Berkey (1991) has attributed the relative infrequency of peasant revolts in the 
Ottoman Empire during the seventeenth century to its provincial structure that promoted 
disunity, a difference that also applied to the comparison with the Abbasids.  Another factor was 
the difference in the nature and consequences of military conflicts.  Between the eleventh and 
thirteenth centuries, Muslim rulers suffered a series of military invasions by the Crusaders and 
the Mongolians with not only devestating social and economic consequences for the people but 
political consequences for the rulers as well.  Nothing comparable happened during the Ottoman 
rule until the nineteenth century.  The differences in the demographic makeup, institutional 
structure, and external threats of the Ottoman and Abbasids empires gave the Ottoman rulers an 
advantage in acquiring greater political power against the general public.   
Entering the political scene around the turn of the fourteenth century, the Ottomans 
employed many of the same methods used by their predecessors to establish their own power 
and to deter competitors' entry into the power struggle, often adding a distinctive Ottoman 
dimension to these methods.  They monopolized a patrimonial right to rule for six centuries, 
supporting their right with a distinctive genealogy. Although they could not justifiably claim 
(though some contemporary historians tried) lineage from the Prophet Muhammad or his tribe, 
the official genealogy asserted descent from the Qayı clan, ultimately leading to the legendary 
Oguz Khan, who is said to have conquered the world and given rise to Turkish tribes.  To 
promote their reputation and maintain their monopoly over the right to rule, they laid claim to 
  15several honorary titles (such as ghazi, caliph, and protector of the holy cities) that had spiritual 
significance among the subjects and signaled superiority over the rulers of other Muslim states.  
They also invested heavily in conspicuous public goods (such as mosques, fountains, and 
religious schools), ostentatious ceremonies, and other public symbols of power
13. 
In addition to promoting the reputations of sultans or the sultanate in general, the 
Ottomans developed various distinctive governance institutions to maintain their power to rule. 
The organization of the military ensured that the rulers possessed a huge comparative advantage 
over competing groups in employing violence.  Central to this advantage was the well-known 
and distinctive Janissary organization, consisting of the sons of the non-Muslim subjects brought 
to Istanbul, trained with sole allegiance to the Sultan to serve in his army.  In the organization of 
the cavalrymen (sipāhi), the Ottomans similarly implemented various mechanisms, such as 
giving the cavalrymen the right to collect taxes and subjecting their appointment to periodic 
rotation, which helped to align their incentives with those of the ruler and limited their ability to 
develop separate interests and organize independently against the ruler. 
The Ottomans also designed various wealth-revealing institutions to gather and 
monopolize information about private wealth.  In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, they 
recorded information about taxable activities in tax registers called tahrir defterleri, involving 
various administrative personnel including assessors, scribes, and accountants
14. As conducting 
the tax registers became less feasible after the sixteenth century, they relied on public auctions to 
gather the relevant information (Coşgel and Miceli, 2006).  The information recorded in registers 
was not for the use of the general public but for the government to know about taxable 
                                                 
13 For recent descriptions of Ottoman methods of legitimization, see Imber (2002: Ch. 2), Karateke (2005), and 
Quataert (2000: Ch. 6). 
14 Coşgel (2004), Darling (1996). 
  16productive activities.  By gathering and monopolizing this information, the rulers could use it to 
their advantage in deciding how much of the output to capture as tax.  
The relative importance of these methods changed over time, depending on the relative 
strength of governance institutions in supporting the ruler's control of the Empire.  Early in 
Empire's history, before its governance institutions were well-developed, greater emphasis was 
put on promoting the characteristics of the ruler or sultanate in general.  Over time, as these 
institutions grew stronger in their ability to support the ruler and as the rulers established control 
over them, the emphasis shifted. Studying this transition, Yılmaz (2005) has recently argued that 
the source of state power shifted from the piety and moral integrity of the ruler to the strength of 
institutions and procedural practices during the time of Süleyman the Lawgiver.  At some point, 
governance institutions were strong enough that personal characteristics of the ruler or his title 
made little difference for his power among subjects or against other rulers.  Some rulers even 
came to power as children; others continued to rule despite well-known mental or moral 
deficiencies. Institutionalized power of the Ottoman family's right to rule was never seriously 
challenged during its long reign for six centuries.   
By the time the Ottoman state was established in the fourteenth century, the basic 
ingredients of a strong legal community had already been completed. The Islamic legal system 
had been growing for over six centuries, developing numerous institutions that could easily be 
transplanted to the Ottoman state.  The schools of interpretation (madhab) were highly 
developed, and the procedures for judges and jurisconsults were laid out. Conventional systems 
of education, interpretation, and adjudication were sufficiently standardized to ensure the 
transmission of skills and knowledge between generations and across regions and states. Rather 
  17than start from scratch, the Ottomans could simply build upon this institutional inertia and 
strength.  
The Ottomans once again added a distinctive Ottoman dimension to this process by 
implementing procedures and designing an organizational structure that helped to raise the power 
of the legal community to a new level
15.  Entry was restricted, because appointment as a teacher 
or judge required advanced formal education in a college (madrasa) and the sponsorship of a 
senior member of the community.  The legal community controlled the educational system, 
which was organized in a hierarchical structure.  The highest position was held initially by the 
chief judge (kazasker) and after the sixteenth century by the chief jurisconsult (şeyhülislam), who 
had the ultimate authority in legal matters.  The Ottoman state gave official status to the Hanafi 
School, thus fostering the monopoly that this school achieved in legal interpretation in the lands 
occupied by the Empire. They also initiated a systematic codification and standardization of the 
secular law (kānūn) that applied to such administrative matters as taxation and criminal justice
16.  
The legal community thus derived enormous power from its monopoly in knowledge, education, 
and administration of the law
17.  The community was powerful enough for the rulers to be 
concerned about making sure to keep it under control.   
The rulers introduced various institutional changes and implemented new mechanisms to 
control the legal community.  The most important was their prerogative to appoint the chief 
judges and the chief jurisconsult, which gave them the ability to manage the entire hierarchy.  
This effectively brought the entire legal community into state bureaucracy, giving the ruler the 
                                                 
15 For recent studies of the Ottoman legal system, see Gerber (1994), Imber (2002: Ch. 6), Vikør (2005), and Zilfi 
(1988). 
16 For the development of the Ottoman criminal law, see Heyd (1973). 
17 Although the Ottoman scholars faced significant challenges from the Sufi orders in the provision of religious 
services, we ignore these controversies to be able to focus on the legal system.  For an analysis of the controversies 
of the seventeenth century, see Zilfi (1988). 
  18ultimate authority in decision-making and incorporating the legal community's power under his 
own.  The Ottomans also standardized the entire system of colleges, appropriating the rights to 
appoint college professors and to dictate their syllabus by the sixteenth century
18.  Judges and 
teachers effectively became state employees on government payroll, rather than autonomous 
scholars appointed independently and supported entirely by private fees and charitable 
foundations.  Their tenure at a certain assignment was short and subject to periodic rotation.  
Even jurisconsults increasingly came under government control, becoming government 
appointees after the fifteenth century.  Whatever enormous power the legal community may have 
possessed actually came to belong to the ruler
19. 
 
RULERS, LEGAL COMMUNITY, AND TAXES 
   Numerous considerations can go into the design of a tax system.  In traditional analysis 
of government and taxation, rulers were considered as benevolent protectors of the general 
public applying some general criteria, such as efficiency, simplicity, or fairness, in deciding how 
to tax each source of revenue.
20  Recent political economy models, by contrast, have viewed 
rulers as being interested primarily in the maximization of their own welfare, the tax system 
emerging as the outcome of the ruler's power relationship with the general public and influential 
groups
21.  
                                                 
18 Implementing a dual legal system with religious and secular components and basing the secular component on the 
ruler’s authority also added to his power.  
19 The question of why rulers (political leaders) were able to control the legal community, rather than the other way 
around, is also important, but beyond the scope of this paper. 
20 For examples of approaches viewing rulers as benevolent protectors, see İnalcık (1973), İnalcık and Quataert 
(1994), and Genç (2000).  For recent examples and reviews of the pertinent literature on how changing balance of 
power have resulted in significant shifts in political institutions and religious and legal interpretation in Islamic 
history, see Esposito (1999), Vikør (2005) and Zubaida (2003) 
21 See, for example, Acemoğlu and Robinson (2005) and McGuire and Olson (1996).  See also Weingast and 
Wittman (2006) for the political economy approach to various other topics. 
  19  There are two essential components of a tax system, namely the tax base and the rate 
structure.  At a basic level, the first problem is to determine an appropriate base for taxing 
productive activities and other sources of revenue.  In modern economies, the problem emerges 
as the question of, for example, whether to tax income, consumption, or property as the 
appropriate base.  Historically, there has always been the problem of determining whether to 
base the tax on the inputs, outputs, or some other component of a productive activity
22.  For 
example, if a group of taxpayers are powerful and they prefer the government to choose the 
output (e.g., because this would allow the production risk to be shared with the government), 
rather than one of the inputs, as the tax base, then the government might have to cater to this 
preference (even though this might lower the expected tax revenue or have undesirable 
consequences for efficiency or fairness).  Similarly, if another group of producers is not very 
powerful and they have lower tax-elasticity in one type of base than the other, then the 
government might choose the former type as the base in taxing their productive activity.  The 
comprehensive outcome of these deliberations forms the base component of the tax system, 
enforced by the bureaucracy and overseen and regulated by the legal community. 
  The other essential component of a tax system is the rate structure.  To see the conflict of 
interests over the tax rates, consider the simple problem of taxing the production of a single good 
as presented in Figure 1
23.  The inverted-U shaped curve, generally known as the Laffer curve, 
shows the relationship between the tax rate and tax revenue.  As the tax rate rises, the revenue 
may at some point start to fall because raising the tax rate beyond a critical level may reduce the 
                                                 
22 For the effect of risks and transaction costs on the choice between tax bases and the allocation of revenue, see 
Coşgel (2005) and Coşgel and Miceli (2005) 
23 A more formal model with mathematical details of this illustration is available upon request. 
  20work incentives so much that output and tax revenue also fall. Suppose for simplicity that the 
level of government expenditures is given, as illustrated in the figure





tR = Ruler’s Best 
 tC = Constrained Choice 
 tW = Workers’ Best 
 
Figure 1: Comparison of tax rates for a given level of spending. 
tW        tC               tR                                    Tax Rate 
 
It is easy to see that if the government is controlled by a ruler who can set the tax rate to 
maximize his own consumption (excess of tax revenues over spending), he would choose tR.  
This can be called the Ruler’s Best outcome, preferred by a ruler who can ignore the interests of 
workers in setting tax policy.  If, on the other hand, the workers have the power to dictate the tax 
rate, they would choose tW, the Workers’ Best, where the tax revenue is just enough to cover the 
expenditures.  A third possibility is when there is a binding participation constraint by the 
workers, a kind of “exit” option or a requirement that they achieve a minimum level of net 
                                                 
24 Numerous public goods were provided privately by charitable foundations (waqfs) in Islamic societies, 
particularly by those serving redistributive and poor-relief functions.  For the functions and financing of private and 
imperial charitable foundations in Islamic history, see Kuran (2001) and Orbay (2006). 
  21wealth to take part in this economy voluntarily.  This is shown by the tax rate tC, called the 
Constrained Choice, the level of which would depend on such things as the alternatives (e.g., 
migration) available to workers and their ability to depose or replace the ruler if he behaves in a 
tyrannical way.  Note that the participation constraint may or may not be binding, and 
correspondingly tC may or may not be higher than tW. 
  Political institutions matter greatly in determining the final outcome.  Whereas in an 
absolute dictatorship a ruler may be able to raise taxes to achieve the Ruler’s Best, the rate may 
fall as low as the Workers’ Best in a perfect democracy.  The legal community’s role too may be 
defined by the institutional structure.  In general, given the unique role of the legal community in 
providing legal goods and services and issuing rulings, they would be expected to have some 
responsibility to regulate or influence the choice of tax rate.  This may happen, for example, if 
the legal community is charged with the task of issuing and/or enforcing rulings that determine 
which tax rate should apply to a new economic activity or whether a proposal by the ruler to 
raise an existing tax rate should be implemented.  In a democracy, for example, the legal 
community’s role may be defined as the protection of the interests of the general public.  In an 
absolute dictatorship, on the other hand, the ruler may be able to reduce the role of the legal 
community so much that it no longer exercises an effective constraint on the ruler’s behavior.   
If the legal community has complete independence, the outcome would depend on their 
objective function, presumably any tax rate between tW and tR being possible
25.  One would 
expect the legal community’s objective to be the correct application of the law.  But the ruler or 
the public may still be able to influence the legal community’s decisions indirectly by 
manipulating their objective function.  In reality, even in the absence of direct dictatorial control 
                                                 
25 For the difficulty of formulating a well-defined objective function for judges and a model of judicial decision 
making based on reputation, see Miceli and Coşgel (1994) and McCubbins and Rodriguez (2006).   
  22of its decisions, the legal community’s objectives could also depend on the structure of its 
members’ selection and compensation schemes.  For example, as was the case under the 
Ottomans, the ruler may be able to incorporate the legal community into the government 
bureaucracy or design a payment scheme that would align the interests of the legal community 
with the ruler, in which case the outcome may resemble dictatorship.  Alternatively, the general 
public may somehow elect the members of the legal community or determine the structure of 
their incentives, for example, by means of a popular assembly, so as to align the interests of the 
legal community with the general public.  Thus, the outcome may move closer to absolute 
dictatorship or perfect democracy, depending on the structure of the incentives and appointment 
of the legal community. 
  Even when the political structure may not allot much institutional power to the legal 
community, the latter may still be able to influence outcomes based on their de facto power, if 
any.  As discussed earlier, the legal community was able to acquire significant power during the 
Abbasid period as a result of the unique capabilities and accomplishments they managed to 
accumulate over time.  Once again, in such cases they may use their power in various ways, 
including the protection or institutionalization of their own interests, strict application of the law 
and the precedent, or some other objective.  The legal community’s influence on the tax rate 
would depend on their objective function.   
  Another mechanism for a ruler to use his power to increase his revenue is rate 
discrimination among activities or taxpayers.  For example if tax-elasticities were different 
between the sectors of the economy or between groups of taxpayers, the ruler could raise revenue 
by rate-discriminating among them, just as a producer with a monopoly power in a market can 
raise revenue by price-discriminating among groups of customers with different price-elasticities 
  23of demand.  Rate discrimination could also be observed if the participation constraint varied 
significantly among easily identifiable groups of taxpayers.   
 
RULERS, LEGAL COMMUNITY, AND TAXES IN ISLAMIC HISTORY 
  While the relationship between the ruler, the legal system, and the general public went 
through different stages in Islamic history, the struggle for power has reflected in a conflict over 
taxes and resulted in outcomes corresponding to the changing balance of powers discussed 
above.  The conflict over taxes involved the determination of which assets and activities should 
be taxed and at what rate, and who should pay these taxes.  The struggle started as early as the 
time of Prophet Muhammad, who imposed on Arab tribes the payment of taxes as a necessary 
condition for belonging to the Muslim community (Shaban, 1976: 14).  His successor and the 
first Caliph Abū Bakr had to fight some of these tribes because of their refusal to pay taxes.  The 
conflict over taxation continued throughout Islamic history, becoming controversial even in the 
case of zakāt, one of the Five Pillars of Islam, because of ambiguities over the state’s role in the 
collection and distribution of this obligatory payment designated for the benefit of the poor and 
other enumerated groups.  Some rulers have demanded that payments be made to the state, rather 
than directly to the designated beneficiaries, creating the type of conflicts that has continued to 
modern day
26.  
  The rulers’ power gave them great freedom in choosing the tax bases and setting the tax 
rates during this period.  The legal community did not significantly constrain the rulers, and the 
only concerns to prevent rulers from taxing as they pleased were the powers (e.g., strength of 
their tribe) or participation constraints (e.g., the possibility of peasant flight to towns) of the 
                                                 
26 See, for example, Calder (1981), Dutton (2004), Scott (1997), and Zysow (2002). 
  24producers.  Within those parameters, rulers could take advantage of their monopoly power by 
setting the tax rates close to the Ruler’s Best and engaging in price discrimination in taxation, for 
example by implementing different types and rates of taxes that depended on the religion (e.g., 
dzjizya taxes on non-Muslim), regional customs (e.g., new taxes inherited from previous rulers), 
and economic ability (e.g., access to irrigation) of the producers.  The significant changes made 
by Al Hajjāj Ibn Yūsuf (694-713) show the power of the state.  He changed the laws on land tax 
(kharāj), which in principle was equivalent to rent payment in return for using land, to make it 
mandatory on all former users who no longer cultivated the land (Katibi, 1994: 96).  Surplus 
taxation was successfully forwarded to the central treasury in Damascus, a practice that had been 
opposed by several provinces especially by the Iraqis who wanted to control the Sawad revenues 
(Kennedy, 1986).  In implementing the tax system, the rulers did not have to worry too much 
about abiding by the legal status of land or taxpayers, about ensuring the conformity of taxes and 
rates with canonical categories, or about maintaining interregional or interpersonal equity in tax 
burden.  The result was a set of taxes that varied significantly among regions, persons, and 
economic activities, as the rulers saw fit to maximize their tax revenues
27.  
  Constraints on the ruler’s ability to manipulate the tax system and the legal community’s 
ability to regulate his behavior gradually emerged during the Abbasid period, corresponding to 
the rising authority of the legal community in regulating the tax system.  Various events that took 
place during the Abbasid era support these implications.  The rulers began routinely consulting 
the legal community in matters related to taxation, soliciting books from prominent members of 
the legal community to codify or reform the tax system.  Over 20 manuscripts on taxation, with 
such titles as “Book on Taxation” (Kitāb al-Kharāj), were written during this period, some of 
                                                 
27 For a description of the taxes observed in early Islamic societies, see Aghnides (1916), Cahen (“Bayt al-Māl,” 
“Darība,” “Kharāj”); Løkkegaard (1950); and Oran and Rashid (1989). 
  25which survive to this day, giving us a glimpse of the tax system and the legal community’s 
involvement in it.  Of those that have survived, the book by Abū Yūsuf is known for its judicial 
approach
28.  Advising the ruler Hārūn Al Rashīd, Abū Yūsuf laid down a plan to reform the land 
tax and pointed out the violations of the law that needed to be addressed (Abū Yūsuf, 1979:65).  
Although Al Rashīd adopted some changes and ignored others, it is still clear that the ruler’s 
discretion over the tax system had become more limited.  Another well-known event supporting 
the growing influence of the general public and the legal community on taxation during this 
period was the choice among tax bases.  Based on complaints by the public and advice by legal 
scholars, the Caliph Al Mansūr is said to have changed from input taxes (misāha) to output taxes 
(muqāsamah) on the basis that the switch would improve the taxpayers’ welfare by providing 
them better ability to deal with natural risks (Al Rayyis, 1961:408; Løkkegaard, 1950: Ch. V).  
Mutazillite sources indicate that Caliph Al Wathiq showed recognition to the religious scholars 
and proposed involving them in matters of tax collection (Van Ess, 2006).  Evidence suggests 
that when additional taxes were needed, the ruler had to consult with the legal community and 
that religious scholars retained significant power even when they were out of office.  When 
Qutuz wanted to raise taxes to finance the fight against the Mongols, it was pertinent to consult 
with Ibn Abdel Salam, the retired Chief justice of Fustat before he could do so (Jackson, 1996). 
The Ottoman rulers' control of the legal community meant an alignment of their interests 
and a modification of the legal community's objective.  To secure an appointment or to rise up in 
the hierarchy of the Empire, the members of the legal community had an incentive to cater to 
interests of the ruler as necessary, rather than interpret the law independently, particularly in 
                                                 
28 Three of these books have been translated into English and published by Ben Shemesh under the title Taxation in 
Islam (three volumes).  The book by Yahyā b. Ādam, a contemporary of Abū Yūsuf, is based primarily on the 
tradition of Prophet Muhammad.  For a list of known books based on taxation published during the Abbasid period, 
see Shemesh (1967: 3-6). 
  26areas that directly affected the ruler's welfare.  True, the rulers typically did not interfere in cases 
involving private parties, such as divorce, inheritance, and theft, giving the jurisconsults the 
freedom to issue opinions and the judges the ultimate authority to decide on these cases.  But in 
cases involving a direct conflict between the ruler and others, it was unlikely for the legal 
community to decide against the ruler or to issue opinions that conflicted with his objectives.  As 
Imber (2002: 243) has argued, whenever the jurisconsults were consulted on the legality of an 
intended action involving the rulers, they “knew exactly the reality of the situation on which they 
were delivering an opinion, and in almost all cases were prepared to give the sultan, or other 
authority, the answer he was seeking.”  Although there were, of course, occasional rulings in 
qadi courts issued against state employees that tested the limits of the ruler’s control, the legal 
community for the most part sided with the ruling institution.  This was perhaps most evident in 
the case of Ebu's-su'ud, the famous chief jurisconsult of Süleyman the Lawgiver in the sixteenth 
century, whose harmonization of secular administration with religious law amounted to 
nullifying constraints on rulers originating from the religious law
29.  So forceful was the 
alignment between the interests of rulers and the legal community that constitutional law was 
never developed and the question of how best to impose legal constraints on the coercive powers 
of the ruler was never seriously considered.  
The result was a system of public finance that catered primarily to the interests of the 
ruler.  In terms of the model presented earlier, this effectively meant that the objective of the 
legal community became the maximization of the ruler's welfare, rather than appropriate 
application of the law.  Consequently the ruler's power became combined with that of the legal 
community, and he could attempt to choose the best tax rate possible, without interference from 
the legal system.  The ruler's discretion to raise the tax rates as much as possible was clearly 
                                                 
29 See Imber (1997) for the accomplishments of Ebu’s-su’ud. 
  27sanctioned by some of Ebu's-su'ud famous interpretations.  When asked for an interpretation on 
the question of whether the tithes (öşür) were to be collected literally at the canonical rate, he 
argued that it was “not necessary that it be levied [at a rate of] one tenth. It is imposed according 
to what the land can support and is licit up to a half” (Imber, 1997: 127).  The rates thus varied 
significantly between the different regions of the Empire, some being significantly higher than 
one tenth, such as the remarkably high rate of forty percent observed in parts of the Fertile 
Crescent (Coşgel, 2006).  
In general the Ottomans were able to implement a tax system that maximized tax 
revenues as much as possible, subject only to the responses of the general public
30.  To avoid 
resistance in newly conquered areas, they often preserved the prevailing taxes and rate structures, 
rather than impose wholesale changes that could have harmonized them with other parts of the 
empire, making significant changes if they could raise the revenue without significant 
opposition.  They did not impose the çift tax system to the Balkans or the Fertile Crescent, 
because doing so could have provoked significant opposition to their rule, invoking the 
participation constraint and ultimately reducing their revenue (Coşgel, 2005).  For the same 
reason they did not change the output tax rates that varied between villages in the Fertile 
Crescent to a uniform rate structure prevailing in the rest of the Empire (Coşgel, 2006).  But they 
did introduce significant changes in some areas if those changes were likely to raise the revenue 
without significant resistance.  They abolished the feudal labor services that existed in the 
Balkans before conquest, converting them to cash payments that meant higher revenues going to 
the central treasury.  The decision on whether to preserve or change the previous system did not 
involve any constraints or interference from the legal community. The rulers could choose the 
                                                 
30 A significant exception to the high powers of Ottoman rulers could be seen in the malikāne-divanī system, where 
the Ottomans granted concessions to local lords to be able to secure their allegiance at the time of conquest by 
allowing them to receive a share of the tax revenue. 
  28tax bases and tax rates based on whether they raised tax revenues, not whether they met some 
legal criteria.  Efficiency was also the guiding principle in their allocation of tax revenues among 
recipients and in their choice among methods of tax collection (Coşgel and Miceli, 2006). 
 
CONCLUSION 
The legal community played a central role in developing the institutional roots and 
regulating the economic consequences of the rulers’ power in Islamic history.  Although the 
Ottoman rulers enjoyed a great deal of power, such strength was not necessarily a given, static, 
or common characteristic of all Islamic states.  Centuries earlier, the Abbasid rulers faced more 
significant constraints to their coercive powers as limited by the different set of circumstances 
surrounding their reign.  Preceding the Abbasids in one of the earliest stages of the development 
of the Islamic state, the Umayyads also faced a different set of circumstances, which for them 
meant great powers, though in a different way than the Ottomans.  Throughout Islamic history, 
the rulers’ power varied significantly over time and across contemporary states, some rulers 
having more power than others over their subjects and organized groups. 
Using a political economy approach to state power and taxation, we have studied the 
changing relationship between the rulers, legal community, and general public in Islamic history 
and the corresponding ability of the legal community in constraining the rulers.  Evidence from 
different episodes of Islamic history supports the argument about the role of the legal community 
in taxation.  Early in Islamic history, the Umayyad rulers faced no significant constraints to their 
powers in taxation because the legal community was not yet sufficiently and independently 
developed to be a factor in decisions.  As the Islamic legal system became more established and 
the legal community gathered greater influence during the time of the Abbasids, the rulers’ 
  29coercive powers in taxation became more constrained.  Centuries later, the key to the Ottoman 
rulers’ success in securing high monopoly powers in taxation was their ability to incorporate the 
legal community into the government bureaucracy and to appropriate their power by controlling 
the top of their hierarchy.   
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